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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Case No. 920478-CA 
v. Priority 2 
MAURINE MCGUIRE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction for this case is conferred upon the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, 
as amended). 
Statement of Issue 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH AND 
SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR TELEPHONE 
HARASSMENT. 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for a criminal conviction after a bench 
trial is set out in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987), 
where the Supreme Court stated that judicial findings and 
inferences drawn by the trial court are to be given "great weight" 
and only rejected if "clearly erroneous". This Court has further 
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explained that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." State v. 
Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah App. 1987). 
Determinative Provisions or Statutes 
The determinative statute for this case is Section 11.08.030 
of the Salt Lake City Code, which statute is set out fully in the 
Addendeum attached hereto. 
Statement of Case , 
Defendant/Appellant Maurine McGuire (hereinafter referred to 
as defendant) was served with an Information and Summons for 
Telephone Harassment in January, 1992. The case was tried before 
the Court, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding. The Court 
found defendant guilty on July 7, 1992, and defendant was 
subsequently sentenced. 
Statement of Facts 
Appellee concurs with defendant's Statement of Facts with the 
following additions. 
The witness Mrs. Taylor was asked numerous times during the 
course of the trial about the identity of the voice of the person 
making the harassing telephone calls. She continued to respond 
that it was the voice of Maurine McGuire, whom she had known for 
several years (T. 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9). In addition, she was able to 
state that the voice had a unique distinction of a "kind of 
laughter to everything she says" (T. 10). 
Mr. Taylor also identified the voice in the telephone calls 
that he answered as Maurine McGuire, stating he had spoken to her 
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on the telephone at least ten times on previous occasions (T. 14, 
15 and 16). Mr. Taylor attempted to describe the voice, stating 
that "it was a voice you can't forget" and it had a "voice change" 
(T. 16). 
In addition, a telephone call was made to the Taylor residence 
by Lisa Larson pursuant to a request by defendant. Ms. Larson 
testified that defendant told her to say something about "getting 
a prosecutor" after Ms. Taylor or that charges would be pressed (T. 
19 and 32). She did not recall saying anything about the police 
(T. 32). Defendant's testimony was that she asked Ms. Larson to 
say "the next time she wants to send the police to someone's door 
in the middle of the night that she should be sure she has the 
right person" (T. 23). 
Summary of Argument 
The evidence presented during the trial of this case included 
the positive identification of defendant's voice by the witnesses 
based on specific qualities and characteristics of defendant's 
voice and the witnesses' prior association with defendant. There 
was further direct evidence that defendant made the harassing 
telephone calls because she instructed another person to actually 
make one of the calls. The Trial Court judged the credibility of 
the witnesses and heard the characteristics of defendant's voice 
before finding defendant guilty of the offense. 
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Argument 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH AND 
SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR TELEPHONE 
HARASSMENT. 
The offense of Telephone Harassment under Salt Lake City Code 
Section 11.08,030, as set out in the Addendum attached hereto, 
includes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at inconvenient hours 
and the use of obscene, profane or threatening language with intent 
to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy. According to Plaintiff's 
Exhibit One, also set out in the Addendum attached hereto, and the 
testimony of the witnesses, telephone calls started at 
approximately 10:31 p.m., were made within several minutes of each 
other and continued into the next two days (T. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 8). 
The language used in the calls was obscene, profane and threatening 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit One, T. 4 and 15). The telephone calls 
made to the Taylor residence were harassing under the Salt Lake 
City Code. 
In an old case, State v. Karas, 138 P. 788, 790 (Utah 1913), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that a person's: 
(V)oice is a competent means of identification, and one 
by such means alone may be sufficiently identified. . . 
But the testimony should be reasonably positiv€> and 
certain, and based upon some peculiarity of the person's 
voice, or upon sufficient previous knowledge by the 
witness of the person's voice. 
In that case, the witness testified that he thought the voice 
belonged to the defendant but was not willing to swear to it in 
Court. There was no evidence that the witness had previously 
spoken with the defendant. Karas, 138 P. at 289. The Court found 
there was insufficient evidence to uphold the verdict, stating: 
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Had it been shown that the witness had previous knowledge 
of the defendant's voice, and for that reason, or because 
of some peculiarity of the voice, was able to tell the 
defendant's voice when he heard it, or had he shown such 
associations or acquaintances with the defendant as to 
fairly presume he had such ability, and then had been 
able to testify with a reasonable degree of positiveness 
and certainty that the voice he heard was the defendant's 
voice, the sufficiency of the evidence as to identity 
might be conceded. But nothing of the kind was shown. 
Karas, at 791. 
In State v. Booker, 709 P. 2d 342 (Utah 1985), the Supreme 
Court explained the Karas rule, limiting it to cases where the 
voice identification is the sole piece of evidence linking the 
defendant to the crime. However, that Court stated "voice 
identification alone is considered insufficient to support a 
conviction unless shown to be especially reliable. Booker, 709 
P.2d at 345. 
In State v. Kilpatrick, 173 P.2d 284, 285 (Utah 1946), the 
Supreme Court stated that voice identification is sufficient when 
the identifier is "familiar with the voice of the person" or the 
voice possesses "some peculiar characteristic which could not be 
easily mistaken". In addition, the Court allowed the evidence of 
identification to be bolstered by circumstantial evidence. State 
v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 128 (Utah 1986), also indicated that 
circumstantial evidence could be used to identify a voice. 
The instant case differs from the above cited cases in that 
Ms. and Mr. Taylor positively identified the voice of defendant. 
When asked several times during the course of the trial, they did 
not hesitate to state that it was the voice of defendant, unlike 
the witness in the Karas case. Although it is a difficult task to 
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describe a voice, both witnesses attempted to do so. Ms. Taylor 
stated it had a "laughter" to it and Mr. Taylor stated it was an 
unforgettable voice with a "voice change". In addition, the 
witnesses provided reliability of their identification through 
their prior conversations with defendant and knowing her for 
several years. 
The testimony of the witnesses met all prongs of the 
reliability test set out in Karas and Kilpatrick, namely, the 
identification was reasonably positive and certain, it was based on 
a peculiarity of the voice and it was based upon previous knowledge 
and familiarity of defendant and her voice. 
This case did not include any circumstantial evidence linking 
defendant to the telephone calls received by Ms. and Mr. Taylor; it 
included direct evidence that defendant was willing to harass the 
witnesses over the telephone. Lisa Larson make a call to the 
Taylors' answering machine at the direct request of defendant. 
During the trial of the case, the Court had the opportunity to 
hear the defendant's voice and any peculiarities of that voice. 
The Court was able to assess the voice in light of the descriptions 
of the witnesses as having a "laughter" to it and being 
"unforgetable" with a "voice change". At the conclusion of the 
trial, the Court specifically stated that he was convinced of the 
guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and that the telephone 
calls were made by defendant. The Court found that the witnesses 
had spoken on the phone enough to identify the defendant's voice. 
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The Court also found that the call made by Lisa Larson was 
close enough in time to be considered as further evidence of 
telephone harassment on behalf of defendant (T. 34-35). 
The Trial Court not only judged the credibility of the 
witnesses in this case, it was able to hear the voice of defendant 
in making its determination. The evidence is sufficient that 
defendant made repeated, unwanted telephone calls, using obscene, 
profane or threatening language with intent to terrify, intimidate, 
harass or annoy. 
Conclusion 
The verdict in this case was not "clearly erroneous" but based 
on adequate evidence supported by facts and a review of the record. 
The evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of telephone 
harassment. Appellee respectfully requests that the decision of 
the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of January, 1993. 
Marsha* S. Atkin 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Ms. Leisha M. Lee-Dixon, Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's Association, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 19th day of January, 1993. 
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11.08.010 
11.08.050 Place of commission of offense 
involving use of telephone. 
11.08.010 Assault 
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled 
with a present ability, to commit a violent injury 
on the person of another: It is unlawful for any 
person to commit an assault within the limits of 
Salt Lake City. (Prior code § 32-1-2) 
11.08.020 Battery. 
A battery is any wilful and unlawful use of 
force or violence upon the person of another. It is 
unlawful for any person to commit a battery 
within the limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3) 
11.08.030 Telephone harassment 
A. A person is guilty of telephone harassment 
if, with intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she: 
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a 
conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful 
communication, including but not limited to 
making a call or calls and then terminating the 
call before conversation ensues; or 
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls 
at extremely inconvenient hours; or 
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use 
of telephone communication in a manner likely 
to provoke a violent or disorderly response; or 
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes 
any false statement concerning injury, death, dis-
figurement, indecent conduct or criminal con-
duct of the person telephoned or any member of 
his/her family, or uses obscene, profane or 
threatening language with intent to terrify, 
intimidate, harass or annoy. The making of a 
false statement as herein set out shall be prima 
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, 
harass or annoy. 
B. Telephone harassment is a Gass B misde-
meanor: (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code 
§ 32-1-19) 
11.08.040 Emergency telephone abuse. 
A. A person is guilty of emergency telephone 
abuse if such person: 
1. Intentionally refuses to yield or surrender 
the use of a party line or a public pay telephone to 
another person upon being informed that such 
telephone is needed to report a fire or summon 
police, medical or other aid in case of emergency, 
unless such telephone is likewise being used for 
an emergency call; or 
2. Asks for or requests the use of a party line or 
a public pay telephone on the pretext that an 
emergency exists, knowing that no emergency 
exists. 
B. Emergency telephone abuse is a Gass B 
misdemeanor. 
G For the purposes of subsection A of this 
section: 
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which 
property or human life is in jeopardy and the 
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the 
preservation of human life or property; 
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or 
telephone circuit consisting of two or more main 
telephone stations connected therewith, each sta-
tion with a distinctive ring or telephone number. 
(Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 
32-1-20) 
11.08.050 Place of commission of offense 
involving use of telephone. 
Any offense committed by use of a telephone 
as set out in Sections 11.08.030 and 11.08.040, or 
their successors, may be deemed to have been 
committed at either the place at which the tele-
phone call or calls were made, or at the place 
where the telephone call or calls were received. 
(Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 
32-1-22) 
Chapter 11J2 
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 
Sections: 
11.12.010 Riot. 
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